The standard literature contains two arguments that have explained the motivations for holding a large number of reserves in emerging Asian countries. First, these countries, which want to protect themselves from sudden shocks in the external sector, and stock reserves are seen as a means of realizing their wish (. B for example, Aizenman and Marion, 2003; Kim et al., 2005; Aizenman and Lee, 2007). It is widely argued that East Asian countries suffered greatly during the 1997-1998 crisis and that more international reserves are protecting these economies from sudden shortages of international liquidity, which will prevent such a crisis event in the future (Park and Estrada, 2009). This argument therefore attributes a precautionary reason to the retention of reserves. On the other hand, intentions related to stimulating export growth and FDI flows through a large accumulation of reserves are attributed on the trade grounds (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002; Dooley et al., 2004; Aizenman and Lee, 2007). Dooley et al. (2004), that emerging Asian countries have implemented strategies to undervalue their exchange rates and manage important exchange rate interventions, and these strategies have been successfully followed over time, as these countries have accumulated reserves.2 Mody and Sandri (2012) examine the behaviour of sovereign risk differentials in euro area countries before and after the 2007-09 crisis. They show that after the introduction of the euro in 1999, the state gaps in the euro area converged. Following the Bear Stearns bailout in March 2008, spreads increased in countries where vulnerable financial sectors are likely to be saved. After Lehman`s bankruptcy in September 2008, spreads increased dramatically in countries with higher debt ratios. Following the bankruptcy of the Anglo-Irish bank in January 2009, spreads increased in the euro area due to the increasing vulnerability of the financial systems of all member countries. The United States launched the Marshall Plan for the economic recovery of the European Union in order to provide significant financial and economic assistance to the reconstruction of Europe, largely through subsidies rather than loans.
The member countries of the Soviet bloc, for example. B Poland, were invited to receive the subsidies, but obtained a favorable agreement with the COMECON of the Soviet Union.  In a speech at Harvard University on June 5, 1947, U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall stated that the institutions were formally organized at a constituent session in Savannah, Georgia, from March 8 to 18, 1946.  It should be noted that Savannah was missing from the USSR, which had signed the bretton Woods final law, but had subsequently decided not to ratify it. The USSR never joined the IMF and IBRD, although its successor, the Russian Federation, did so in 1992. Australia and New Zealand also did not formally participate in Savannah (observers sent to Australia), although they subsequently joined the IMF and I IBRD.